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On Making a MarriaEe, an Institute, or a Society
1. Leadership
The ingredients of leadership require a mix of the
philosophical and practical not easily found. We are
used to labelling these as strategies and tactics, but
that division is scarcely fine enough. At the least,
there are two kinds of tactics those required to
initiate a modified vision of the future within present
realities and hostilities, and those required to con-
solidate this vision in order to make this future the
present. The strategy and the two kinds of tactics re-
present three different styles or talents which have not
generally been comfortably accommodated in one person.
A flair for strategy is not measured by ｷ ｩ ｮ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｾ or
losing. That is the yardstick for tactical success. Nor
is it measured by the gradual disappearance of problems
as solutions are evolved. Every solution, good or bad,
will generate new problems, just as every increase in
understanding reveals new unknowns. A strategy, then,
is a success of the solutions devised lead to new problems
which are more tractable and more simply resolved.
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China now seems to be one country which has carefully
crafted a strategy. One facet of this strateey is self-
sUfficiency, but it is not expressed directly in terms
of the nation. That would be mildly interesting, but the
key wrinkle is that this goal is proposed for social units
on small spatial areas. So it is a goal of self-sufficiency
for the village (the production brigade) or for the
communes which are collections of contieuous villages.
From this specific addition to the goal flow the most
profound social consequences.
There is a tea commune near Hang Chow which occupies
the most productive tea growing land in China. It is a
scarce crop of high quality which generates a very high
yield and return. Despite this, when new land was brourht
into agricultural use, the land was not planted to tea but
to lower yield, lower cash return crops like rice, wheat
and market vegetables. In a national sense, it is the
heieht of inefficiency not to concentrate on tea. But it
makes great sense if the goal is for that commune to be
self-sufficient in food. It makes great sense for a
country which has historically been so shaken by famine
and war.
Not ｾ ｲ from Shanghai there is another agricultural
commune with over 20,000 people occupyinr 688 ha. Now,
and in the past, this commune has had diversified
agriculture, and the expression of self-sufficiency
has taken a different form. It can now no longer be
described as a simple agricultural community, but as
an integration of agriculture with light industry.
The light industry has been triggered by various spe-
cific needs of that commune. And so, one sees small
factories innovating, developing, and ｭ ｡ ｮ ｵ ｦ ｡ ｣ ｴ ｵ ｲ ｩ ｮ ｾ
harvesting machines designed for the particular needs
of that agriculture. Household equipment is manufactured,
as well as the objects more traditionally thought of as
handicrafts. There is even a factory producing light-
bulbs, partly for commune use and partly for export.
Again, from Western eyes, a factory producinr lirht-
bulbs on this small scale seems folly. There are no
economies of scale and it is bewildering to imagine
the replication of these small factories throughout
major parts of China. But again, the roal is not economic
advancement, but self-sufficiency of a small unit. And to
implement that goal, there must be great diversification
of activities,and hence of experience,within the community
concerned.
The consequence of that strategy of self-sufficiency,
at that scale, is diversification within the community,
close recycling of material, internal experimentation and
innovation, and independence. For the society as a whole
the cost of failure of anyone of these communes will have
very little consequence, even though the probability of
such failure might be high. In the West, our strategy
would lead us to decrease the probability of failure even
if when a failure occurred, the cost were lmmense. Re-
member the blackout in the Northeastern United States?
But in a social sense, the strategy is of even
greater consequence. For when the inevitable problems of
the community emerge, they are detected by the same
people who have the experience and the power to resolve
these problems. Because of the emphasis on small spatial
scale, there is not a spatial separation between the source
of the problem and the source of the solution. And for
that reason, there is intense, personal motivation.
A counter-example is found in the history of other
developing countries. Edgar Snow speaks of the intro-
duction of English land ownership laws into Burma prior
to the Second World War. Traditionally, land was under the
effective control of a village, but with the new temptation
of temporary wealth, over fifty percent of the best rice
paddies ultimately fell into the hands of absentee land
owners. This was less of a strategy than a happening, but
it led to an inflexible system which could not respond to
the emergencies of drought, or, generally, to the needs
for change. And it could not respond because the peasants
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(read: institute staff or wife) who lived the problem
were not the landlords (read: administration or husband)
who could resolve theM. The option of the village it-
self resolving by joint sharing and experimentation was
foreclosed.
True strategic failure occurs when solutions lie in
other, isolated hands. That is the route which leads to
systems analysis as the panacea of the world's ills --
glue for the unglued.
The successful strategy then makes possible the
easy exploration of alternate tactics. One important
set are the tactics of initiating a fresh concept and
direction within a system which by definition resists
change. And these tactics must dance between the ex-
tremes of dictatorial fiat and subtle deviousness, both
of which are seeds for disaster.
The tactics of initiation can make or break the
consolidation and day-by-day operations. Allende con-
ceived and initiated a grand strategy for Chile which
was successfully established through an even more unique
tactic of initiation within existinv, institutional and
legal frameworks. But it led to tragic disaster because
of unrealistic preconditions for consolidation.
ｾＶＭ
All effective tactic of initiation must of course
honor the concept and strategy. But the eenius comes
when it is structured to reduce not the number of future
problems, but the cost of those problems in human terms --
in short, a resilient structure.
Nor 1S this division into strategy and tactics a
division between idealistic and praematic as our present
breed of politicians would contend. That particular
dualism leads to the barren denunciation of idealists as
woolly-headed (remember Lester Pearson?) and prafmatists
as evil (remember Truman?). Both strategy and tactics
must be equally infused with the ｩ ､ ･ ｾ ｬ and with the
practical.
But grand strategy and sensitive tactics of initiation
become subverted without the quite different tactics of
consolidation. And it is equally necessary for these
tactics to have both a philosophy and a technique of day-
by-day operation which, in this case, prevents the ideal
from being smothered by detail. Or from beinE attenuated
by time. It requires a sense of the need, not for stability,
but for flexibility within persistence.
The bureaucrat's dream of stability might make his
life sane, but it turns an ･ ｮ ･ ｲ ｧ ｩ ｺ ｩ ｮ ｾ ideal into a boring
ideology, It becomes a wisp that can be seen but not
grasped. The tactics of consolidation are tactics of
desifned instability which capture and lead that natural
rhythm of enthusiasm, eXhaustion, boredom, and renewed
enthusiasm experienced by all individuals, institutions
and societies.
But where are these talents? We certainly see a
reasonable number of individuals with excitinv, humane
and well articulated strategies -- but they lack the sense
of the ｴ ｡ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｾ to initiate and operate. We probably do
not find as many individuals with superb talents for
initiation - - but when we do, they often do not know what
they are initiating. The commonest talents are those of
consolidation -- but in their drive for stability the in-
dividuals having these talents destroy the substance.
Perhaps no one person can ever blend all three talents.
Perhaps the best our poor world can expect is the happy
appearance of individuals with a blend of two of the three.
But if that is the case, any grand enterprise must have two
leaders -- one a strategist-technician and one a tactician-
strategist. Every Mao needs a Chou En-Lai in marriages,
institutes, and societies.
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